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A B S T R A C T
In a seminal study, Yoon, Johnson and Csibra [PNAS, 105, 36 (2008)] showed that nine-month-
old infants retained qualitatively diﬀerent information about novel objects in communicative and
non-communicative contexts. In a communicative context, the infants encoded the identity of
novel objects at the expense of encoding their location, which was preferentially retained in non-
communicative contexts. This result had not yet been replicated. Here we attempted two re-
plications, while also including a measure of eye-tracking to obtain more detail of infants’ at-
tention allocation during stimulus presentation. Experiment 1 was designed following the
methods described in the original paper. After discussion with one of the original authors, some
key changes were made to the methodology in Experiment 2. Neither experiment replicated the
results of the original study, with Bayes Factor Analysis suggesting moderate support for the null
hypothesis. Both experiments found diﬀerential attention allocation in communicative and non-
communicative contexts, with more looking to the face in communicative than non-commu-
nicative contexts, and more looking to the hand in non-communicative than communicative
contexts. High and low level accounts of these attentional diﬀerences are discussed.
1. Introduction
Humans are expert learners. We learn implicitly, through mechanisms like statistical learning (Fiser & Aslin, 2001; Kirkham,
Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Newport & Aslin, 2004), and explicitly from others through social learning (Csibra & Gergely, 2009,
2011; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Social learning can occur either through observation (Meltzoﬀ, 1988a,
1988b; Meltzoﬀ & Moore, 1989), or through pedagogy, or explicit teaching (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Csibra, 2007; Tomasello et al.,
2005). Although teaching usually involves language, knowledge transfer can also occur in its absence. Two types of communicative
cues have been suggested to be key to information transmission through teaching: ostensive cues such as direct eye contact or infant
directed speech (IDS) convey the intention of communication, and referential cues such as pointing or gaze shifts direct attention to
the source of the information to be learned (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Csibra, 2010). According to the Natural Pedagogy theory (Csibra
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& Gergely, 2009) ostensive communicative cues signal to infants when to learn culturally relevant kind-generalizable information
about an object. In the presence of these cues, infants would be biased to encode surface features, which support learning about object
kinds, over spatio-temporal information.
One method to investigate how infants encode object properties is the violation of expectation paradigm (VoE). The VoE para-
digm is based on the assumption that infants look longer at events that violate their expectations (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Teglas
et al., 2011; Woodward, 1998), including when features of an object change (Krøjgaard, 2009; Mareschal & Johnson, 2003). Yoon,
Johnson, and Csibra (2008) used a VoE paradigm to test the hypothesis that being communicated to should bias infants to encode
surface features. In their study, the authors presented the infants with videos of communicative and non-communicative scenarios.
The communicative videos included IDS, direct eye contact, and pointing, whereas the non-communicative videos included adult-
directed speech (ADS), no direct eye contact, and reaching. In communicative scenes, an actress said ‘Hey baby!’ in IDS, while
engaging in direct eye contact, and then pointed towards a novel object out of reach on the left or right side of the scene. In non-
communicative scenes, an actress said ‘What’s this?’ in ADS, while looking at the object, and then reached towards the object. Screens
then occluded the object and actress. After a few seconds, the occluders opened to reveal the object again. At the point of reveal,
either the identity or location of the object had changed, or no change occurred.
Infants looked longer at the identity change in the communicative condition and at the location change in the non-communicative
condition (both in terms of ﬁrst look and total look length). The authors concluded that infants encoded the identity of the object after
being communicated to, as this was relevant to kind-generalizable learning. In contrast, infants encoded the location of the object in
the non-communicative condition, due to this being the default, or perhaps the attempted reach enhancing the perceived graspability
of the object. This double dissociation in the encoding of identity and location information suggested that the communicative cues did
not merely increase overall memory, but elicited a speciﬁc memory bias towards identity information.
There have been few papers so far attempting to replicate or extend this ﬁnding. Okumura, Kobayashi, and Itakura (2016) found
that in a live study, infants showed an identity bias in a direct gaze condition. However, the authors did not replicate the ﬁnding of a
location bias for the condition with no direct gaze, instead ﬁnding encoding of both identity and location. The authors suggest that,
due to the video deﬁcit eﬀect (Anderson & Pempek, 2005), infants may have performed better in their study than in the original
study, therefore managing to encode both identity and location in the non-communicative condition. Their ﬁndings suggest that
instead of identity being preferentially encoded by infants after viewing communicative scenes, it may be that infants are able to
encode both spatiotemporal and recognition-relevant features, but ostensive signals disrupt location encoding. Two studies following
up on this result in adults drew the same conclusions (Marno, Davelaar, & Csibra, 2014, 2016), ﬁnding encoding of both identity and
location information in the non-communicative condition, and only encoding of identity in the communicative condition. As there
are only two studies investigating communicatively induced memory biases in infants, we felt it was necessary to replicate the
original ﬁnding before extending this research ourselves.
After being sent example videos from one of the original authors we noticed that in the communicative videos, the actress pointed
for longer than she reached (6.8 s compared to 4.5 s). This diﬀerence raises the possibility that a longer duration of having the hand
on screen could be responsible for inducing an identity memory bias. Therefore, in our stimuli both types of actions were performed
twice for the same duration. Also, in the original study, the actress had bars stopping her from being able to reach the object. We did
not use bars in our stimuli, instead having the actress be too far away from the object to reach it, in order to conceptually replicate the
idea that the actress was unable to reach the objects, but without obscuring her. Lastly, we used eye tracking to investigate infants’
distribution of attention while observing the communicative or non-communicative scenes. Although Yoon et al. (2008) compared
overall looking to the action scenes and reported no diﬀerence between conditions, this does not speak to where the infants were
looking while viewing these scenes. A diﬀerence in attention allocation in the two contexts could be responsible for the memory
biases observed. For example, as preverbal infants tend to follow referential cues only when these are preceded by ostensive cues
(Senju & Csibra, 2008; but see Gredebäck, Astor, & Fawcett, 2018; Szufnarowska, Rohlﬁng, Fawcett, & Gredebäck, 2014), we thought
that perhaps in the communicative context infants would look more directly towards the objects, and that this could enhance the
encoding of features. As this part of the study was exploratory, we did not pre-specify speciﬁc hypotheses relating to looking during
the pre-occlusion section of the videos. We report two replication attempts. The ﬁrst replication, Experiment 1 (bar the changes
outlined above), followed the methodological details reported in Yoon et al. (2008). In the second replication, Experiment 2, we made
slight changes to the method and exclusion criteria following guidelines provided by Csibra (personal communication, November
2017). Both replication attempts were pre-registered, and all data, code, supplementary results and materials are openly available on
the Open Science Framework (OSF) (https://osf.io/77gpt/).
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
Experiment 1 was conducted following the methods section of Yoon et al. (2008), bar some changes outlined in the introduction.
Participants were recruited from a database of families at an infancy lab of a UK university, and were given a book as a gift for
participation and £10 travel reimbursement. Parents gave informed, written consent before participation, and were free to withdraw
their consent. All data were kept conﬁdential. Both experiments were approved by the university ethics committee and adhered to the
British Psychological Society guidelines.
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2.1.1. Participants
2.1.1.1. Replication. Forty-two normally developing 9-month-old infants took part in the experiment. Of these twenty-four were
included in the replication analysis (mean age: 274 days; range: 258 days to 286 days; 9 female; 23 Caucasian; 20 monolingual
English). Exclusion criteria matched those used in Yoon et al. (2008): Infants were excluded for ceiling looking time for all trials
(n= 4), experimenter error (n=4), fussiness (n=7), and not looking during one or more occlusion events (n=3). An occlusion
event in this experiment was deﬁned as the time between the ﬁrst frame of the clip when the occluder starts closing, and the ﬁrst
frame when the occluder is fully closed.
2.1.1.2. Scene analysis. We were able to use less stringent exclusion criteria for this analysis as our exclusion criterion of watching the
entire occlusion event was irrelevant when looking at infant looking before the occlusion. Of the forty-two infants who took part in
the experiment, 40 were included in the scene analysis (mean age: 276 days; range: 258 days to 322 days; 17 female; 39 Caucasian;
20 monolingual English). Two infants were excluded due to experimenter error.
2.1.2. Stimuli
We created the video stimuli and digitally added objects (on the left or right side of screen) and occluders on each clip. Infants ﬁrst
saw two familiarization trials. These familiarization videos were 29 s long and consisted of the actress moving around slightly to
upbeat music, while looking either at the infant with direct gaze and smiling (communicative condition), or at the object with
intrigue (non-communicative condition) (6 s). After this, yellow screens occluded the object and actress (3 s), there was a short break
where the occluders stayed closed (5 s), the object screens revealed the object again (with no change) (2 s), and the object remained
on screen for a maximum of 15 s (less if the infant looked away for two seconds, in which case the next trial was advanced). We
always used the same two objects, but counterbalanced across participants for actress, side and order.
In the test videos (Fig. 1), there was ﬁrst an introductory sentence produced by the actress (“Hey baby!” with direct gaze for the
communicative videos, and “What’s that?” with gaze to the object for the non-communicative videos) (4 s). This was followed by the
action being executed once towards an object to the front of the actress on the left or right side (a point or a reach towards the object
as if to try and grasp it) (4 s). The actions were completed at an equal distance away from the object, and were of the same duration.
After completing the action once, the actress returned to the resting position and said either “Wow” (with direct gaze) while waving
at the infant (communicative) or “Hmm” (without direct gaze) with a hand on her chin (non-communicative) (4 s). After this, she
produced the pointing or reaching action again (4 s). Following this, screens moved to occlude both the object and the actress (2 s).
The occluders stayed on the screen (5 s), after which the object screens reopened (2 s) to reveal the object. There had either been no
change to the object, or it had changed in either identity or in location. The objects stayed on screen for a maximum of 15 s, or until
infants looked away for 2 s. Test videos were 37 s long. Occluders produced sounds when opening and closing to direct infant
attention to these events.
We obtained the objects from the Noun database (Horst & Hout, 2015), and chose 6 pairs with medium similarity ratings. We used
the ﬁrst of each of these pairs as the initial object, and the paired objects for the identity change condition (i.e., when the object
changed identity, the second object in the pair was what it changed into). Every infant saw all 6 of the objects at test. Which object
was shown for which condition combination was pseudo-randomised into 8 trial orders (with 3 infants viewing each order). Which
actress played which role (communicative or non-communicative) was counterbalanced across infants. Object, side of action, con-
dition and outcome were pseudo-randomised in the 8 possible trial orders. Additionally, infants never saw more than two trials
similar on any factor (e.g. no more than two left actions) in a row. All videos are openly available on the OSF.
2.1.3. Procedure
Infants sat on their caregiver’s lap during the experiment in front of a 23-inch screen (seated approximately 0.6m away). An eye-
tracker (Tobii X120) captured infant looking times and locations on screen for the action scene analysis. We used Tobii studio 3.3.1 to
present stimuli and gather eye-tracking data. A camera placed above the screen fed input directly into Tobii studio, from which videos
of infants were later exported for oﬄine looking time coding. We performed a 9-point calibration for all infants before beginning the
experiment. After this calibration, we instructed parents not to talk to or interact with their infant, and the experiment began.
Infants saw 2 familiarization videos (1 communicative, 1 non-communicative) followed by 6 test videos (for each of the com-
municative or non-comunicative familiarization video there was one no change, one identity change, and one location change test
video). Therefore, each infant contributed one trial per sub-condition to the replication analysis, and three trials per condition to the
scene analysis.
2.1.4. Analysis
2.1.4.1. Replication. We performed all analyses on raw data in R (R Core Team, 2017). All code is openly available on the OSF.
Videos of infants were exported from Tobii studio and infant looking was blind coded in ELAN (2019)(Version 5.0.0). A second blind
coder performed secondary coding on 20% of videos. We found a high degree of reliability between coders: the average measure ICC
was 0.97 with a 95% conﬁdence interval from 0.95 to 0.99. The length of the ﬁrst look was deﬁned as the time between the infant
looking towards the screen and their ﬁrst look away, beginning at the ﬁrst frame of the occluders opening. The total looking time was
deﬁned as the cumulative length of time of all looks towards the screen, beginning at the ﬁrst frame of the occluders opening, and
ending at the ﬁrst frame of the next attention getter.
We replicated the analysis by Yoon et al. (2008). We carried out a 2× 3 repeated ANOVA on the length of ﬁrst look to screen after
object reveal as a function of action (communicative vs. non-communicative) and outcome (identity change, location change, no
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of stimuli in the test trials. Full videos are available on the OSF.
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change), with follow up one-way ANOVAs and parametric and non-parametric pairwise tests. The same analyses were conducted for
total looking times.
2.1.4.2. Scene analysis. We performed all analyses on raw data in R. All code is openly available on the OSF. We exported raw data
from Tobii Studio 3.3.1, and visualized and analyzed them in R using the eyetrackingR package (Dink & Ferguson, 2016). First, Areas
of Interest (AOIs) were created for face (630×310 pixels), hand (385× 340 pixels), and object (380× 340 pixels) areas of the
videos. The data were then visualized as a timecourse. We performed a bootstrapped cluster based permutation analysis (Maris &
Oostenveld, 2007) to establish during which time-points conditions diﬀered signiﬁcantly. This involved running a test on each time
bin (17ms) that quantiﬁed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between actions (communicative vs. non-communicative). We grouped into
clusters the adjacent bins that showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. We then shuﬄed the data and performed this same test on one
thousand iterations of the shuﬄed data. This produced a table of the probability of each cluster appearing under the null hypothesis.
Clusters that had a probability of less than 5% of appearing under the null hypothesis (i.e., p < 0.05) were considered to be
signiﬁcant. This test accounts for both Type 1 and Type 2 errors, by controlling the false-alarm rate while sacriﬁcing little sensitivity
(Maris & Oostenveld, 2007).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Replication: ﬁrst look length
We compared the length of ﬁrst look in a 2×3 ANOVA with action (communicative vs. non-communicative) and outcome
(location change, identity change, no change) as within-subject factors (Fig. 2). There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of outcome [F
(2,46)= 4.15, p= 0.02, ηp2= 0.15]. There was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of action [F(1,23)= 0.2, p= 0.66] or signiﬁcant in-
teraction between action and outcome [F(2,46) = 1.32, p= 0.28]. Paired comparisons by parametric (Student’s t) and nonpara-
metric (Wilcoxon rank-sum) tests were carried out to assess the eﬀect of each outcome on the looking times. Infants looked longer to
the identity change than the no change outcome, regardless of communicative context. Looking was signiﬁcantly longer for the
identity change than the no change outcome [t(23) = 2.79, p= 0.008, ηp2= 0.26; Wilcoxon’s Z = -2.45, p= 0.01], whereas
looking time for the identity change and location change [t(23) = 1.47, p= 0.15] and location change and no change [t(23) = 0.95,
p= 0.35] outcomes did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. A nonparametric McNemar test found that this diﬀerence could be attributed to some
of the infants rather than the entire group. Six of the 24 infants showed the behaviour reported in Yoon et al.’s study (longer looking
at identity change than no-change after communicative scenes and longer looking at location change than no-change after non-
communicative scenes), 9 infants showed only the identity bias (longer looking at identity change than no-change after commu-
nicative scenes), 5 infants only showed the location bias (longer looking at location change than no change after non-communicative
scenes), and 4 infants showed the opposite pattern in both contexts (longer looking at the identity change than no-change after non-
communicative scenes and longer looking at location change than no change after communicative scenes). This distribution was not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from chance (McNemar’s p= 0.42).
2.2.2. Replication: total look length
Total looking length was compared in a 2×3 ANOVA with action (communicative or non-communicative) and outcome (location
change, identity change, no change) as within-subject factors (Fig. 3). There was no main eﬀect of outcome [F(2,46)= 0.66, p=
0.52] or action [F(1,23) = 0.01, p= 0.93], showing that overall infants did not look longer at test in either the communicative or
non-communicative condition. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between action and outcome [F(2,46) = 3.5, p= 0.04, ηp2 =
0.13]. We carried out separate 3-level one-way repeated-measures ANOVAs followed by paired comparisons by parametric (Student’s
t) and nonparametric (Wilcoxon rank-sum) tests to assess the eﬀect of each outcome on the looking times. In communicative context
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Mean duration of ﬁrst look with SE bars for each outcome grouped by communicative context.
P. Silverstein, et al. Infant Behavior and Development 55 (2019) 77–87
81
trials, there was no diﬀerence in looking time between the three outcomes [F(2,46)= 1.06, p= 0.35]. In non-communicative
context trials, there was a main eﬀect of outcome [F(2,46) = 3.91, p= 0.03, ηp2= 0.15]. Further analyses revealed signiﬁcantly
shorter looking for location change compared to both identity change [t(23)= 2.36 p= 0.03, ηp2= 0.19; Wilcoxon’s Z = -2.34,
p= 0.02] and no change [t(23) = 2.21 p= 0.04, ηp2= 0.18; Wilcoxon’s Z = -1.76, p= 0.08] (note: when using a non-parametric
test the diﬀerence between looking time to location change compared to no change was not signiﬁcant). There was no diﬀerence
between identity change and no change outcomes [t(23)= 0.61, p= 0.55].
2.2.3. Scene analysis
Figs. 3, 4 and S5 (see Supplementary materials on the OSF) show proportion looking to the face, hand, and object AOIs, re-
spectively, for communicative and non-communicative scenes. Overall, infants showed similar looking patterns when viewing both
types of scenes (looking towards the face the most, especially when the actress was speaking, looking towards the hand when the
point/reach was being performed, and very little looking towards the object at any time point). A bootstrapped cluster-based per-
mutation analysis found that during both of the periods where the hand action (point/reach) was not being performed (0–3000ms,
6000–9000ms), looking towards the face was signiﬁcantly higher in the communicative condition (p = 0.027 and p = 0.048
respectively), and conversely, during the ﬁrst time the action (point/reach) was performed (3000–6000ms), looking towards the
hand was signiﬁcantly higher in the non-communicative condition (p= 0.024) (Fig. 4). Looking towards the object was very low
overall and did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between conditions. Overall looking time towards the scene did not diﬀer between conditions
[t(39)= 0.03, p= 0.98].
2.3. Discussion
2.3.1. Replication
Our results do not replicate the ﬁnding by Yoon et al. (2008) that infants show a memory bias for identity information after
viewing communicative scenes, and a memory bias for location information after viewing non-communicative scenes. Neither do we
ﬁnd that communicative scenes disrupt the encoding of location information, which is preserved when viewing non-communicative
scenes (Marno, Davelaar, & Csibra, 2016; Marno et al., 2014; Okumura et al., 2016). Instead, our results suggest that infants show
longer looking to identity changes regardless of communicative context (measured by length of ﬁrst look). However, we found that a
minority of infants drove this eﬀect, and that we do not ﬁnd the results in the same direction for total look, weakening our belief that
this truly indicates an identity memory bias. If we do interpret this result as an identity memory bias, this is surprising, given that the
default for preverbal infants seems to be to encode location over surface features (Carey & Xu, 2001; Haun, Call, Janzen, & Levinson,
2006; Mareschal & Johnson, 2003; Xu & Carey, 1996). After this ﬁrst replication attempt, we contacted Csibra, who generously
provided detailed comments that led to some key methodological changes in Experiment 2.
2.3.2. Scene analysis
Our results showed that there are diﬀerences in where infants allocate their attention when viewing communicative and non-
communicative scenes. Infants looked more towards the face when direct gaze and infant-directed speech were displayed, and more
towards the hand when a reach was performed than when a point was performed. This shows that even before infants are actively
communicating themselves, they are responding diﬀerently when they are being communicated to, compared to when they are not.
As both communicative and non-communicative scenes involved speech and the same sequence of actions, we can reasonably assume
that diﬀerences are due to more speciﬁc features of the two types of scene. This experiment cannot clarify whether these diﬀerences
are due to low-level perceptual diﬀerences or a higher-level understanding of being communicated to.
We found that infants looked more towards the face when direct gaze and infant-directed speech were used. However, in these
Fig. 3. Experiment 1: Mean duration of total look with SE bars for each outcome grouped by communicative context.
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scenes, this was also when the actress was waving to the infant. We could hypothesize that merely the movement of waving the hand
is more salient than the moving of the head to look at the object in the non-communicative scenes, purely because there is more
motion involved. Alternatively, consistent with Natural Pedagogy account (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), infants might look more towards
the face when ostensive signals are present because they are prepared to learn from the interlocutor. Again, our results cannot
diﬀerentiate between these two interpretations.
We also found that infants looked more towards the hand when it was reaching than when it was pointing. This diﬀerence in
looking occurred at a diﬀerent time-point to where we saw diﬀerences in looking towards the face, suggesting that this is not merely
the other side of the coin (i.e. when infants are not looking at the face they are instead looking at the hand), and is in fact a diﬀerent
process at play. One low-level interpretation for this result could be that the hand occupies more space when it is a reaching hand
than when it is a pointing hand, which could draw the infants’ attention. Also, the reaching hand moves around a little, to show that
the actress is unsuccessfully trying to reach the object, whereas the pointing hand does not move. Like the waving in the commu-
nicative videos, enhanced hand looking in this case could simply be the product of motion drawing the infants’ attention.
Alternatively, as the goal for the reach is to grasp the object, infants might ﬁxate on the hand in order to see what happens next (i.e.
whether the person manages to reach the object), whereas in the communicative condition, the goal of the point (to communicate)
has been reached as soon as the infant perceives and understands it themselves. Again, these data do not speak to which of these
interpretations is more likely. Our question was not the mechanisms behind any attentional diﬀerences, but instead whether at-
tentional diﬀerences could be driving memory biases, and so further research should investigate the reasons for these diﬀerences.
However, as we ﬁnd an identity bias regardless of action condition, these diﬀerences in where infants allocate their attention cannot
Fig. 4. Proportion looking to face (top) and hand (bottom) plotted over time (ms). N=40.
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be responsible for any memory biases in our experiment. It is also worth noting that infants are not looking at the object in either
context, suggesting that they are not fully understanding the goal, as in both cases the goal is either to share attention about an object,
or to reach the object. We know that 12-month-olds anticipate the goal of reaching actions by looking at the object, but 6-month-olds
do not (Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006), so perhaps the infants in our experiment are too young to fully comprehend
these goal directed actions (but see Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011).
3. Experiment 2
After communication with Gergely Csibra (personal communication, November 2017), we were made aware of some important
methodological diﬀerences between our replication attempt and the original study. Most importantly, we found that our inter-
pretation of ‘occlusion event’ was not the same as theirs. We had interpreted the ‘occlusion event’ as the time where the occluders
were currently closing, whereas they had meant it to mean the time where the occluders were closing, plus the entire period where the
object is currently occluded. As the original exclusion criteria speciﬁed that infants should be excluded if they had not watched all of
the occlusion events without looking away, this meant that we had essentially used a diﬀerent exclusion criterion. When we went
back to our data to check which infants would still be included with this new, very strict criterion, we found that none of them would
be. Further discussion with Csibra made it apparent that in Yoon et al. (2008) the occlusion time had been wrongly reported as ﬁve
seconds, when in fact, in the original stimuli this was actually only three seconds. This longer occlusion time, and the fact that we did
not include any music during the occlusion period, may have been responsible for none of our infants showing continuous looking at
the screen during the whole 5 s occlusion event for all six trials. Therefore, in the second replication attempt, we shortened the
occlusion time to 3 s, added music to the occlusion period, and changed our exclusion criterion to match that of the original paper.
Additionally, this second replication could serve as a conﬁrmation for our action scene ﬁndings, as this analysis was exploratory in
the ﬁrst attempt.
3.1. Methods
Methods remained overall the same as in Experiment 1, but with the changes to occlusion duration and exclusion criteria dis-
cussed with Csibra.
3.1.1. Participants
3.1.1.1. Replication. Seventy-nine typically developing 9-month-old infants took part in the experiment, and of these twenty-four
were included in the replication analysis (mean age: 273 days; range: 261 days to 287 days; 13 female; 22 Caucasian; 23 monolingual
English). Infants were excluded for falling asleep (n=1), ceiling looking time for all trials (n= 7), fussiness (n= 14), experimenter
error (n= 1), and not looking during one or more occlusion events (n= 32). An occlusion event in this experiment was deﬁned as the
time between the ﬁrst frame of the occluder beginning to close and the ﬁrst frame of the occluder being fully open (this was a crucial
diﬀerence to Experiment 1).
3.1.1.2. Scene analysis. Of the seventy-nine infants who took part in the experiment, sixty were included in the scene analysis (mean
age: 272 days; range: 260 days to 289 days; 31 female; 55 Caucasian; 57 monolingual English). Infants were excluded for falling
asleep (n= 1), fussiness (n=11), less than 40% good eye-tracking data (n= 3), and experimenter error (n= 1).
3.1.2. Stimuli
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, except for three changes. First (outlined above), the objects were occluded for three
seconds instead of ﬁve. Second, there was a larger gap (roughly 5 times wider) between occluders when objects were fully occluded.
This was to ensure infants could see that the object had not moved from one side to the other (and thus, a location change would be
genuinely surprising). In order to make such gap larger, the third change was that the objects were made slightly smaller, and moved
further apart, which also made the object spacing more comparable to the original study.
3.1.3. Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1.
3.1.4. Analysis
3.1.4.1. Replication. The analyses were identical to those of Experiment 1. Secondary coding was performed on 20% of videos by a
second blind coder. A high degree of reliability was found between coders. The average measure ICC was 0.95 with a 95% conﬁdence
interval from 0.90 to 0.98.
3.1.4.2. Scene analysis. The analysis was identical to that of Experiment 1.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Replication: ﬁrst look length
The 2×3 ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of outcome [F(2,46)= 0.13, p= 0.88] or action [F(1,23) = 0.62, p=
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0.44] or signiﬁcant interaction between outcome and action [F(2,46) = 1.32, p=0.28] (Fig. S4) (Fig. 5). No statistical inference can
be derived from this non-signiﬁcant result (Lakens, McLatchie, Isager, Scheel, & Dienes, preprint). To determine whether the current
data provides evidence for the null hypothesis (H0) relative to the alternative hypothesis (H1), a Bayes factor was conducted. Bayes
factors (BF01) provide a measure of how likely the data are assuming H0 is true relative to how likely the data are assuming H1 is
true. For the current analyses, a default Bayes factor with a wide cauchy distribution (scale of eﬀect= 0.707) was calculated using
the BayesFactor R package (Morey & Rouder, 2015), and yielded BF01= 4.12. Thus, we can conclude that the data constitutes
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis.
3.2.2. Replication: total look length
The 2× 3 ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of action [F(1,23)= 4.33, p= 0.05, ηp2 = 0.16], with infants looking longer
to all outcome conditions after viewing the communicative videos. There was no main eﬀect of outcome [F(2,46)= 0.09, p= 0.92],
or interaction between action and outcome [F(2,46) = 0.01, p= 0.99] (Fig. S5 on OSF).
3.2.3. Scene analysis
Our ﬁndings from Experiment 1 for the scene analysis were exactly replicated (Fig. S6–S8 on OSF). During both of the periods
where the hand action (point/reach) was not being performed, looking towards the face was signiﬁcantly higher in the commu-
nicative condition (p= 0.002 and p= 0.025), and conversely, during the ﬁrst time the action (point/reach) was performed, looking
towards the hand was signiﬁcantly higher in the non-communicative condition (p= 0.038). There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
proportion looking to the object. Overall looking time towards the scene did not diﬀer between conditions [t(59) = 0.86, p= 0.39].
3.3. Discussion
Our results show no evidence for memory biases, instead showing overall increased attention to the screen at test after viewing
communicative videos. Our scene analysis results completely replicate ﬁndings from Experiment 1, suggesting that the attention
allocation diﬀerences found are reliable.
4. General discussion
We have described two attempts to replicate the results of Yoon et al. (2008). In the original study, infants looked longer at an
identity change following a communicative context, and longer at a location change following a non-communicative context. These
results were interpreted as a preferential encoding of object identity in a communicative context. In our ﬁrst replication attempt, we
found longer looking at identity changes regardless of context. In our second attempt (which, following communication with Csibra
(personal communication November 2017), was better matched to the original study in terms of stimuli and exclusion criteria), we
found no memory biases at all, and instead just higher increased overall attention to the screen after viewing communicative videos
compared to non-communicative videos. It is important to note the discrepancy in the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. If
we assume that the changes in stimuli and exclusion criteria in the two experiments did not have a meaningful impact on infant
looking, these results may be due to random ﬂuctuations due to small sample sizes, as when the two Experiments are combined, we
get moderate to high support for the null hypothesis (see supplementary materials). Alternatively, if we assume that there were key
diﬀerences in the stimuli for the two experiments, we should compare results from Experiment 2 to those found by Yoon et al. (2008),
as these are better matched. These results replicate neither the original study showing a double dissociation of identity and location
memory biases, nor do they replicate other ﬁndings of impaired location memory in communicative contexts (Marno et al., 2014,
2016; Okumura et al., 2016) (Table 1) or even any memory eﬀects in general (Blaser & Káldy, 2010; Kibbe & Leslie, 2011). It may be
Fig. 5. Experiment 2: Mean duration of total look with SE bars for each outcome grouped by communicative context.
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that the method itself is insensitive to measuring infant object memory in this speciﬁc paradigm.
Our results could diﬀer from those found by Yoon et al. (2008) because of small diﬀerences in our stimuli such as the size of the
faces, the use of superimposed objects as opposed to real ones, or the distance between the two objects (video examples from Yoon
et al. (2008) are available on the OSF for comparison). It is also possible that some of these diﬀerences had an eﬀect on the higher
exclusion rate in our study compared to the original (70% vs. 57%) due to our videos being potentially less engaging. We did also
purposefully make the methodological changes of the absence of the bars, and of the matching of the duration of actions in both
conditions. However, we have no reason to assume that any of these factors would aﬀect the postulated creation of memory biases
through the presence or absence of communication. Despite this, it is still impossible to know whether these (or other) changes could
be responsible for the diﬀerence in results. Regardless, these small changes are not accounted for in current theory, which would
predict that with our setup we would ﬁnd the same result as Yoon et al. (2008). The original study is a key piece of evidence for the
claim of Natural Pedagogy that ostensive signals not only enhance attention, but also speciﬁcally induce an expectation to learn kind-
generalizable information. If small diﬀerences to a paradigm can disrupt this, then this might question the generality of the claims
made by this theory, as the changes that we made should not aﬀect the hypothesized mechanism.
It is possible that the current study is a Type 2 error. This seems unlikely, given that we didn’t replicate in either of the two
attempts, and ﬁnd moderate support for the null hypothesis using Bayes Factor Analysis (and moderate to high support for the null
hypothesis if we combine the results from Experiments 1 and 2 – see supplementary materials on the OSF). However, it does remain
possible that the true eﬀect size is smaller than that observed by Yoon et al. (2008), and that a higher-powered study is needed in
order to ﬁnd an eﬀect. Further studies on communicatively induced memory biases in infants could also investigate small metho-
dological changes, in order to see under what speciﬁc scenarios the original ﬁnding holds and advance theory about what information
infants encode in communicative and non-communicative contexts. However, due to the extremely high exclusion rate in the second
experiment (70% of infants tested excluded from the replication analysis), this may be a very demanding and resource consuming
challenge. As out of six experiments (Table 1) only one has shown a speciﬁc identity memory bias induced by communication (as
opposed to the loss of location memory), we believe that within this paradigm, the evidence against the experimental hypothesis is
stronger than evidence for it, and we must consider the possibility that the original result may be a Type 1 error. In order to further
study this hypothesis in a way that doesn’t require more than 50% data loss, we suggest the development of a new paradigm.
Our attention allocation results are robust, with Experiment 2 completely replicating the results from Experiment 1. We found
that at certain time points infants looked more to the face in communicative contexts than in non-communicative contexts, and more
to the hand when it was reaching than when it was pointing. These results could be due to low-level perceptual diﬀerences between
the two types of scene (e.g. with infants allocating their attention to where there is more movement), or to a high-level mentalistic
interpretation of why infants would pay more attention to these areas (awaiting communication from the face in the communicative
context, and awaiting the outcome of the reach in the non-communicative context). We believe there should be caution in attributing
rich interpretations to phenomena that could also be explained by lean, attention-based interpretations (Haith, 1998; Heyes, 2016;
Newcombe, 2002). We originally wished to investigate infant attention allocation in order to relate it to the observed memory biases.
As we do not observe any diﬀerential memory biases for diﬀerent contexts, we cannot relate these attention allocation diﬀerences to
memory. What we can say is that attention allocation diﬀerences do not have an impact on what information is encoded or retained in
our studies. Nonetheless, we feel that, when possible, eye-tracking data should be used in looking time studies to rule out attention
allocation diﬀerences driving eﬀects.
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Table 1
Studies Investigating Communicatively Induced Memory Biases.
Study N Eﬀect size Non-communicative Communicative
(Yoon et al., 2008 – infants) 24 ηp2=0.41 Location encoding Identity encoding
(Okumura et al., 2016 – infants) 28 ηp2=0.15 Location & identity encoding Identity encoding
(Marno et al., 2014 – adults) 24 ηp2=0.16 Location & identity encoding Identity encoding
(Marno et al., 2016 – adults) 80 ηp2=0.20 Location & identity encoding Identity encoding
The current paper: Experiment 1 24 ηp2=0.15 Identity encoding Identity encoding
The current paper: Experiment 2 24 NA, but BF01=5 No encoding No encoding
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